Evidence room for a neighborhood emergency planner. Question dated ; this packet is frozen at that date, the release date of the ERCOT assessment, and reports no later events. ST1

Should ERCOT's published winter reserve be represented as a guarantee for an extreme cold event?

No.

ERCOT's winter assessment says it "anticipates" sufficient installed capacity for forecasted peak demand, and its reserve rows measure "Capacity Available for Operating Reserves, Normal Operating Conditions." That is a planning estimate, not an operational guarantee. In its own harshest column (extreme peak load with extreme generation outages) only 1,352 MW remains. ST1

The 2011 FERC/NERC staff report found that ERCOT and others "had adequate reserve margins, based on anticipated generator availability" going into that storm, "But those reserves proved insufficient." ST2

Decision proposed: plan the neighborhood response for possible rotating outages whenever extreme cold is forecast, regardless of the published reserve (details below). No probability is assigned and no motive is alleged. ST1 ST2

Remaining operating reserve in the four published columns

Capacity available for operating reserves, normal operating conditions, MW, by SARA column Horizontal bars from a zero baseline. Column 1: 16,198 MW. Column 2: 5,892 MW. Column 3: 10,919 MW. Column 4: 1,352 MW. Source ST1, page 2, row e. 1 Forecast peak load, typical outages 16,198 MW 2 Extreme peak load, typical outages 5,892 MW 3 Forecast peak load, extreme low wind 10,919 MW 4 Extreme peak load, extreme outages 1,352 MW 0 MW5,00010,00015,000 Source: ST1, page 2, row [e]
Zero-baseline bars, MW. These are planning margins under normal operating conditions in each column, not measured outages and not a delivery guarantee. Column order follows the printed table. ST1

Baseline reconciliation, all four columns

Each column starts from the same reserve: Total Resources 82,513 MW minus Peak Demand 57,699 MW equals 24,814 MW. Separate adjustments are then subtracted. Every column below adds up exactly to the printed totals. ST1

Range of Potential Risks, MW, printed column order. A dash in the original means no adjustment, shown here as 0. ST1
Row1 Forecasted Season Peak Load2 Extreme Peak Load / Typical Generation Outages3 Forecasted Season Peak Load / Extreme Low Wind Output4 Extreme Peak Load / Extreme Generation Outages
[a] Total Resources 82,51382,51382,51382,513
[b] Peak Demand 57,69957,69957,69957,699
[c] Reserve Capacity before uses (a minus b) 24,81424,81424,81424,814
Seasonal Load Adjustment 09,50909,509
Typical Maintenance Outages, Thermal 4,0744,0744,0744,074
Typical Forced Outages, Thermal 4,5425,3394,5425,339
95th Percentile Forced Outages, Thermal 0004,540
Low Wind Output Adjustment 005,2790
[d] Total Uses of Reserve Capacity 8,61618,92213,89523,462
[e] Capacity Available for Operating Reserves, Normal Operating Conditions (c minus d) 16,1985,89210,9191,352
Derived: thermal forced outages, typical plus 95th percentile 4,5425,3394,5429,879
Total Resources line items as printed (MW) ST1
Forecasted Capacity and Demand, page 2 ST1
Line itemMW
Operational Resources (thermal and hydro)67,529
Switchable Capacity Total3,710
Less Switchable Capacity Unavailable to ERCOT-568
Available Mothballed Capacity0
Capacity from Private Use Networks3,631
Coastal Wind, Peak Average Capacity Contribution1,480
Panhandle Wind, Peak Average Capacity Contribution1,411
Other Wind, Peak Average Capacity Contribution3,251
Solar Utility-Scale, Peak Average Capacity Contribution269
Storage, Peak Average Capacity Contribution0
RMR Capacity to be under Contract0
Capacity Pending Retirement0
Non-Synchronous Ties, Capacity Contribution838
Planned Thermal Resources with Signed IA, Air Permits and Water Rights0
Planned Coastal Wind with Signed IA371
Planned Panhandle Wind with Signed IA0
Planned Other Wind with Signed IA557
Planned Solar Utility-Scale35
Planned Storage0
Sum of line items82,514
[a] Total Resources, as printed82,513

Where column 4 runs out: a sensitivity, not a prediction

Column 4 already counts 9,879 MW of thermal forced outages (5,339 MW typical plus 4,540 MW at the 95th percentile). If every other column 4 assumption stayed fixed, a thermal forced outage total of 11,231 MW, that is 1,352 MW more, would bring capacity available for operating reserves to exactly zero. Including thermal maintenance outages, that is 15,305 MW of thermal capacity out. This is arithmetic on the published table, not a measured outage or a forecast. ST1

Sensitivity control: hypothetical extra thermal forced outages in column 4

Bounded from 0 to 4,000 MW of hypothetical extra outage. The published column stays fixed beside it. Inputs come from page 2, column 4. ST1

Published column 4 (immutable)
1,352 MW
remaining operating reserve, as printed ST1
Hypothetical sensitivity
1,352 MW
with 0 MW extra; thermal forced total 9,879 MW ST1
Published column 4: 1,352 MW Hypothetical: 1,352 MW 0 MW (zero-crossing) ST1

Above zero Baseline: with no extra outage, column 4 keeps 1,352 MW. Zero is reached at 1,352 MW of extra thermal forced outages (11,231 MW total). ST1

What the 2011 FERC/NERC report actually warned

Exact words from the staff report on the February 1-5, 2011 Southwest cold weather event, printed pages 7 to 10. ST2

"They all had adequate reserve margins, based on anticipated generator availability. But those reserves proved insufficient for the extraordinary amount of capacity that was lost during the event from trips, derates, and failures to start." ST2
"But over the course of that day and the next, a total of 193 ERCOT generating units failed or were derated, representing a cumulative loss of 29,729 MW." ST2
"Combining forced outages with scheduled outages, approximately one-third of the total ERCOT fleet was unavailable at the lowest point of the event." ST2
"Generators and natural gas producers suffered severe losses of capacity despite having received accurate forecasts of the storm." ST2
"However, the poor performance of many of these generating units and wells suggests that these procedures were either inadequate or were not adequately followed." ST2
"These recommendations were not mandatory, and over the course of time implementation lapsed. Many of the generators that experienced outages in 1989 failed again in 2011." ST2

Cumulative loss is not a simultaneous outage

Cumulative, over two days
29,729 MW
The cumulative loss from 193 units that failed or were derated "over the course of that day and the next." Units counted here were not necessarily all out at the same moment, so this figure is not a concurrent outage and cannot be set against a single-hour reserve. ST2
At the lowest point
About one-third
"approximately one-third of the total ERCOT fleet," combining forced and scheduled outages, was unavailable at the lowest point. The excerpt gives no MW figure for that moment, so none is supplied here. ST2

On the first day ERCOT had 3100 MW of responsive reserves against a minimum requirement of 2300 MW; reserves "eventually dropped below the level of safe operation." Responsive reserves are a real-time quantity and are not the same row as the SARA planning figure. ST2 ST1

For the Southwest as a whole, 67 percent of generator failures (by MWh) were due directly to weather-related causes, and at least another 12 percent were indirectly attributable to weather through natural gas curtailments and fuel switching difficulties. These are shares of past failures, not a probability of any future event. ST2

Timeline in the packet

  1. Cold weather caused many generators to trip, derate, or fail to start; PUCT winterization recommendations were not mandatory and implementation lapsed. ST2
  2. Rolling blackouts; in ERCOT they affected 3.2 million customers. Many generators that failed in 1989 failed again. ST2
  3. FERC and NERC staffs publish the report quoted above. ST2
  4. ERCOT releases the final Winter 2020/2021 SARA, covering December 2020 to February 2021. ST1

Normal operating reserve versus an operational guarantee

The SARA row is titled "Capacity Available for Operating Reserves, Normal Operating Conditions." It is a seasonal planning estimate for a peak hour built from historical averages and percentiles. It does not promise that this many megawatts will be deliverable at every instant of a cold event, and the summary itself uses the word "anticipates." ST1

2011 showed the gap between the two: margins that looked adequate beforehand were overwhelmed as capacity was lost during the event. ST2

What the SARA does not prove, and this packet cannot bound

Recommended preparedness decision

Decision: adopt a neighborhood cold-weather plan that assumes rotating outages are possible during any extreme cold forecast, whatever the published reserve. Trigger it on the weather forecast, not on grid notices, because in 2011 losses came "despite having received accurate forecasts of the storm." ST2

  1. Confirm a warming location with heat that does not depend on the grid.
  2. Refresh a contact list for residents who rely on powered medical equipment or live alone, with a check-in plan that works without power.
  3. Publish pipe protection and safe outage heating guidance before the cold arrives.
  4. Plan for losses that build over more than one day, not a single peak hour; the 2011 loss accumulated over two days. ST2

In public materials, describe the SARA figures as planning margins under normal operating conditions, with column 4 at 1,352 MW, never as a guarantee. ST1

Sources and method

Links carry the original addresses; opening them needs a connection. Figures were parsed from the packet excerpts by model.py and verified independently by check.py. No named-person claims are made. Nothing after November 5, 2020 is reported. ST1