What the court held, and whose words are whose
Three kinds of statement appear in the record and they carry different weight. A witness's testimony and an appellant's argument are reported by the court; only the court's own conclusions are holdings.
Therefore we accept that when one is looking ex post at whether two deaths were natural or unnatural, the 1:73 million figure is no help. It is merely a distraction.
The fresh evidence of Dr Evett and Professor Dawid demonstrates that the prosecution invited the jury to adopt the figure of 73 million as having a significance in itself when in truth, without reference to the likelihood of a competing possibility, the figure has no relevance or significance at all
The competing possibility identified is a double infant murder by a mother. That may be capable of being expressed in terms of a statistical probability, but legally speaking the exercise is not realistic - see R -v- Denis Adams (No 2) [1998] 1 Cr App R 377, which shows that it is not an exercise the courts would perform.
Professor Dawid goes on to question the appropriateness of squaring 1 in 8,543 in order to produce the figure of 1 in 73 million. He notes the fact that the relevant table: "... does not take account of possible familial incidence of factors" [see paragraph 122 and the penultimate quoted sub-paragraph] and emphasises the possibility that there might be factors predisposing a family with one cot death to another. He suggests, not unreasonably, that the 1:73 million must be regarded as a "ball park" estimate. We do not imagine that the Crown would demur from that suggestion.
He also makes the obvious point that the evidential material in Table 3.58 tells us nothing whatsoever as to the guilt or innocence of the appellant.
The appeal against conviction on each count is therefore dismissed.
Read fairly, the record holds both accounts: at trial the figure was presented as showing two natural deaths in such a family would be very rare; on appeal the court accepted it was "no help" ex post, yet dismissed the appeal. These excerpts do not set out the reasons for dismissal, and this page draws no inference about them. Nor does it treat the absence of an identified natural cause as evidence of homicide: the record measures no such thing.
The arithmetic, reproduced exactly
- Per-birth input. For a family in which the parents do not smoke, at least one has a waged income and the mother is over 26, the cited risk is 1 in 8,543 live births (para 118).
- Squaring. 8,543 × 8,543 = 72,982,849. The notice reported 1:73,000,000, a rounding of 17,151 in the denominator (para 118, para 122).
- Denominator. Each 1 in 8,543 is per live birth. The product, 1 in 72,982,849, is per family with two live births and the three characteristics: a per-family figure, not a per-birth one. The testimony described it as "1 in 73 million live births" (para 114).
- "Once every hundred years." 72,982,849 ÷ 700,000 = 104.26 (using the rounded 73,000,000: 104.29). That divides a per-family-pair frequency by all live births in England, Wales and Scotland in a year, across all families. The yearly number of qualifying two-birth families, which the comparison would need, is not in the record.
- The conditional probability the squaring hides. Two deaths require P(two SIDS) = P(first) × P(second | first). Squaring sets P(second | first) equal to 1 in 8,543, which is independence. The quoted study gives a subsequent-child range from 1 in 214 to 1 in 8,543 across family profiles, assuming the factors stay the same, and says it "does not take account of possible familial incidence of factors" (para 122). That is not a measured recurrence for this family.
The likelihood of SIDS varies with social circumstances. The most recent estimation of the incidence in England is that for a family in which the parents do not smoke, in which at least one has a waged income and in which the mother is over the age of 26 years, the risk is 1:8,543 live births.
Thus the chances of two infant deaths within such a family being SIDS is 1:73,000,000.
Q Later on in the paper does it go on to work out the risk of two infants dying of SIDS in that family by chance alone? A Yes, you have to multiply one in 8,543 times 1 in 8,543 and I think it gives that in the penultimate paragraph, its points out that it's approximately a chance of 1 in 73 million .... It gives a chance of 1 in 73 million live births and in England, Wales and Scotland there are about, say, 700,000 live births a year, so it is saying by chance that happening will occur once every hundred years.
Since the factors will generally remain the same (with the possible exception of maternal age below 27 years) the risk of SIDS to a subsequent child in a family in which one infant has already died will range from one in 214 to one on 8,543. this does not take account of possible familial incidence of factors other than those included in Table 3.58.
For a family with none of these three factors, the risk of two infants dying as SIDS by chance alone will thus be one in (8,543 x 8,543), ie approximately one in 73 million.
The trial therefore started without the defence having the assistance of a medical statistician, and in the event, no such witness was called. But the Crown had no statistical expert either.
What the statistic counts, and what it leaves unmeasured
Counts
- An estimated frequency of two SIDS deaths per family with two live births and the three stated characteristics.
- Only if the second death is independent of the first.
- From one study estimate of 1 in 8,543, given with no interval. As the court reports, Professor Dawid suggested the product be regarded as a "ball park" estimate, and the court did not expect the Crown to demur (para 139).
- A frequency before any death is known: it is not conditioned on the evidence in this case.
Unmeasured in this record
- The chance of a second SIDS death given a first, in this kind of family, including familial factors.
- The incidence of two maternal homicides on the same denominator (para 160 names the possibility; no rate is given).
- Every other explanation: other natural causes, accident, one death of each kind, undetermined deaths.
- How likely the actual medical and physical findings are under each explanation.
- The probability that the appellant is innocent or guilty. The court reported the point that the table "tells us nothing whatsoever" about it (para 141).
The two-hypothesis expression the record supports
P(two SIDS) = (1 / 8,543) × r
Prior odds, two SIDS : two maternal homicides = [ (1 / 8,543) × r ] ÷ h
Here r is the chance a second infant in such a family dies of SIDS given the first did, and h is the incidence of two maternal homicides per family with two live births and the same profile. Both are unknown in this record. No rate for h is invented here.
Bounds that follow from the mathematics alone
- Because 0 < r ≤ 1: P(two SIDS) is above zero and at most 1 in 8,543.
- If one also assumes a first death never lowers a sibling's risk (r at least 1 in 8,543, an assumption the record does not measure), P(two SIDS) lies between 1 in 72,982,849 and 1 in 8,543: a span of 8,543 times.
- For h the record gives nothing narrower than the meaning of a probability. The prior odds can therefore be any positive number.
- These odds compare only two explanations. Even if both were known, they would not give the probability of either, because other explanations exist.
Prior odds, likelihood ratio, posterior: three different things
Posterior odds (two SIDS : two maternal homicides, given E) = Prior odds (two SIDS : two maternal homicides) × P(E | two SIDS) ÷ P(E | two maternal homicides)
E means the actual medical and physical findings, not the absence of an identified natural cause. The likelihood ratio's numerator is under two SIDS, matching the numerator of the odds; using the reciprocal would reverse the direction, and multiplying a ratio by its own reciprocal gives 1, not posterior odds. The record measures neither the prior odds nor this likelihood ratio, so no posterior odds are computed. A posterior probability of guilt would further need every alternative explanation and all the evidence, and the court said this is "not an exercise the courts would perform" (para 160).
Try a hypothetical recurrence
Hypothetical The values below are assumptions for illustration. None is a finding; the record contains no measured recurrence. Whatever you choose, the two maternal homicides comparator stays unknown.
1 in 72,982,849 two-birth families
At the squaring assumption, the formula reproduces the reported 1 in 72,982,849.
Two maternal homicides: unknown, no sourced rate. Prior odds: cannot be computed.
Static equivalent
| Hypothetical recurrence r | Two SIDS, one in | Per 100 million two-birth families | Multiple of 1 in 72,982,849 | Two maternal homicides |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 in 8,543 (squaring assumption) | 72,982,849 | 1.37 | 1.00 | Unknown: no sourced rate |
| 1 in 5,000 | 42,715,000 | 2.34 | 1.71 | Unknown: no sourced rate |
| 1 in 2,000 | 17,086,000 | 5.85 | 4.27 | Unknown: no sourced rate |
| 1 in 1,000 | 8,543,000 | 11.71 | 8.54 | Unknown: no sourced rate |
| 1 in 500 | 4,271,500 | 23.41 | 17.09 | Unknown: no sourced rate |
| 1 in 200 | 1,708,600 | 58.53 | 42.72 | Unknown: no sourced rate |
| 1 in 100 | 854,300 | 117.05 | 85.43 | Unknown: no sourced rate |
| 1 in 50 | 427,150 | 234.11 | 170.86 | Unknown: no sourced rate |
What would change this call
- A sourced, measured probability that a second infant in a family with these characteristics dies of SIDS given that a first did, including familial factors.
- A sourced incidence of two maternal homicides on the same denominator: families with two live births and the same characteristics.
- Sourced incidences for every other explanation: other natural causes, accident, one death of each kind, and undetermined deaths.
- Measured probabilities of the actual medical and physical findings under each explanation, giving a likelihood ratio in the correct direction.
- A basis for combining the items of evidence, including how they depend on one another.
- Even then, the court's statement that courts would not perform this exercise (para 160) means a published number would be the reporter's construction, not the court's finding.
Chronology to the as-of date
- 7 October 1999Expert's notice served stating 1:8,543 and 1:73,000,000. (para 118)
- Trial date not stated in the excerptsTrial begins without a medical statistician for either side. (para 120)
- Trial date not stated in the excerptsWitness testifies to 1 in 73 million and once every hundred years. (para 114)
- 2 October 2000Court of Appeal: figure 'no help' ex post; appeal against conviction on each count dismissed. (para 258)
Source trail
| ID | Document | Publisher | Date | Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SC1 | R v Clark [2000] EWCA Crim 54 | Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) | 2 October 2000 | Open the judgment on BAILII |
Every quotation on this page is taken verbatim from excerpts of SC1, with the paragraph number given in the excerpts. Witnesses not named in the excerpts are not named here.